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On September 29th, large-scale military exercises 
were completed in the west of Russia and Belarus. 
Military training under the name Zapad 2009 (West 
2009) can be described as largest in recent years. 
Armed forces of the Republic of Belarus together 
with military units of Moscow military district, 
Kaliningrad region as well as coastguard units and 
the Baltic Fleet, five large landing crafts of Russian 
Northern and Black Sea Fleets (that specially for 
the given purpose went around Europe to arrive in 
Baltijsk) interacted during the training. 
The main military exercises were held on practi-
cally all the territory of Belarus: from Grodno and 
Brest regions in the west to Mogiliov and Vitebsk 
in the east.
During the military exercises Russia was represented 
basically by the brigade of constant combat readiness 
of Moscow military district, units of the Ivanovo 
98th Airborne Forces and Operative Command 
of the 20th Army. 
On the Belarusian side, structural units of the 
Ministry of Defence, the General Staff of Armed 
Forces (AF), together with other bodies (military 
command, operative command, communication, 
escort and servicing, task forces, etc) of the AF 
military participated in the training. 
All in all around 12.5 thousand military service-
men were involved in the exercises: 6.5 thousand 
of Belarus and 6 thousand of Russia and around 
thirty Kazakh military personnel. Military hard-
ware used: more than 220 combat tanks, around 
470 armoured combat vehicles, 230 self-propelled 
and towed artillery units, mortars and multi-rocket 
launchers, 60 planes and 40 helicopters.
The exercise started on 8 October and was carried 
on under the joint management of  the Minister of 
Defence of Belarus colonel-general Leonid Maltsev 
and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed 
Forces of Russia colonel-general Nikolaj Makarov. 
The final stage of the exercise was observed by 
the Generals-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of 
both countries Presidents Dmitriy Medvedev and 
Alexander Lukashenka.
Talking about the nature of the exercises, high-
standing representatives of both armies did not 
conceal that they were initiated in order to simu-
late military actions in the conditions of possible 
future wars. In particular, the training was aimed 
The October issue of the Bell concentrates on the 
event that took place in September but has not yet 
been analyzed in this publication - military training 
Zapad 2009. Joint military exercise carried out 
on the whole territory of Belarus has spread tense 
atmosphere among the neighboring countries. 
Latvia responded with the statement regarding 
its intention to hold retaliatory large-scale military 
exercises next summer, whereas Estonia urged 
NATO to react accordingly. The contribution by 
Aleksandr Alesin presents the evaluation of the said 
military training as well as the assessment of realistic 
technical and financial potential of Russia. 
The other article of the present issue analyses the 
fourlateral relation between Belarus, Ukraine, 
Poland and Lithuania. Three latter countries are 
very eager to start a closer political and, most im-
portantly, tighter economic relations with Belarus. 
As Roman Yakovlevsky claims, Ukraine is one of 
the most active lobbyists of various projects in-
volving Belarus, especially in the sphere of energy. 
The recent visit of A. Lukashenka to the Ukraine 
demonstrates huge interest from Belarusian side as 
well. One can easily understand it having in mind 
the allowances that Belarus obtained on Ukrainian 
electricity. During the meeting it was agreed that 
they will amount to 50 mln. USD, however, during 
an uncertain period of time.  
Certainly, cooperation with Belarus is not wrong 
per se. However, as Roman Yakovlevsky states in 
his article, while bargaining and negotiating with 
the official Minsk, one has not to confuse expecta-
tions and illusions.
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at investigating the transition to the new military 
command based on the system of network-centric 
wars. The goal was to analyze how the new com-
mand system is able to control the Air Defence and 
Air Forces as well as approbate the joint military 
command system of Belarus and Russia. 
It has to be reminded that the concept of a network-
centric war has been worked out in Pentagon. 
Initially it has been approved during military 
operations in Iraq. Network-centric war presup-
poses such type of combat actions whereby single 
electronic satellite and aviation (including the use of 
un-piloted intelligence aircraft) command systems 
are used in order to operate different forces and 
military devices. 
The essence of the network-centric wars, however, 
is not only large-scale use of electronic means of 
intelligence and targeting but also employment of 
mobile forces that can promptly move and attack 
enemy from flanks or rearward.
According to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Ground Forces of Russia, General Vladimir Bold-
yrev, 85 highly-maneuverable brigades of constant 
combat readiness were formed. They could be used 
in practice without delay in such areas of military 
operations where a likely threat to the national and 
military security may arise.
There are three such threatening directions: west, 
east and south. Each of them has its own charac-
ter and differences with respect to the manner of 
military action that can be taken. Beginning with 
June strategic exercises under the joint name Osen’ 
2009 (Autumn 2009) were conducted along the lines 
of these directions. They included the operative-
strategic exercises Kavkaz 2009, Ladoga 2009 and, 
finally, Zapad 2009.
Military analysts raise a number of questions con-
cerning the given military trainings. First of all, the 
question is whether the Russian army (not to speak 
of the Belarusian) possesses adequate resources 
(satellites, un-piloted planes, computers, etc.) to 
conduct network-centric wars. The other issue is 
whether it has at its disposal a sufficient number 
of special transport vehicles to ensure mobility 
of troops. 
For Russia, the conclusion is far from satisfactory. 
Enormous resources (they may amount to the 
hundreds of billions of US dollars) are necessary 
to reform Russian armed forces according to the 
network-centric military strategy.  
Even putting aside the issue of satellites and mili-
tary electronics, numerous problems exist in other 
spheres. For example, Russia does not possess a 
necessary number of transport vehicles in order 
to re-deploy the troops. First of all, there is a lack 
of heavy military-transport planes and helicopters. 
Russia has only 10 planes An-124 Ruslan, which 
can transport tanks and sundry bulky equipment, 
whereas the number of helicopters is somewhat 
bigger – it amounts to 35.
A simple example may be adduced. The 4th separate 
tank brigade of the 20th army of Moscow military 
district needed nearly five days to arrive to the 
operative-strategic exercise Zapad 2009. Loading 
military equipment onto railway echelons (around 
twenty), unloading, moving forward to the concen-
tration area, camping at a new location, carrying 
out necessary measures related to the coordination 
among subunits took a lot of time. The 15th, 21st and 
23rd motorized infantry brigades of the 2nd Army 
of the Privolzhsko-Uralskij military district were 
traveling from Samara even longer.
And although all of them got through the prescribed 
standards, even non-professionals perceive that in 
the conditions of a network-centric war an enemy 
armed with satellites of the optical and radio-
technical intelligence, planes of distant radiolocation 
detection, let alone un-piloted flying devices, would 
have detected all those movements at their initial 
stage. And would have done his best not to allow all 
those echelons to arrive to their destination.
However, carrying out of the said exercises is im-
portant not only from the military point of view 
but mostly as an indicator of the allied relations 
between Belarus and the Russia. Allied military 
relations with Belarus matter for Russia because 
of its strategic interests (disruption of the military 
union with Belarus would pose a threat to Russian 
defence potential), for Minsk military union with 
Russia is of economic importance. 
By no means, neither the separate radio-technical 
center Baranovichi of the Russian missile attack 
early warning system (MAEWS) in the settlement 
of Gancevichi (Belarus), nor the object Antej (43rd 
communication center of the naval fleet of the RF) 
in Vilejka, nor even the AAD system is the essen-
tial military resource for the Russian military and 
political leadership.  
Mostly important is the very geo-political situa-
tion of Belarus – Russia’s strategic forefield. It is 
kind of a bulge driven into the depth of NATO, a 
‘balcony’ hanging over the whole European theatre 
of military operation.
As the analyst of the Internet newspaper Vzgliad 
(A Look) Genadij Nechaev claims, true is a general 
principle assuming that in case of any conflict be-
tween Russia and Europe, a party striving to take 
the upper hand in it has to ensure control over 
Belarus. At present it is Russia that has advantage 
in the given respect.
If due to any reason Minsk refuses to take into ac-
count Moscow’s strategic interests, Russia will be at 
great pains in an attempt to defend its western and 
north-western borders. Most probably it will have 
to renounce the Agreement on the medium-range 
and shorter-range missiles (MSRM) and create 
missiles of the new generation ensuring a launch 
of preventive strikes against the regions wherein 
NATO troops are concentrated.
It goes without saying that the given development 
of events is unwelcome for Russia. Thus Russian 
authorities will do everything to maintain status 
quo and to keep Belarus its strategic partner.
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Belarus’ activity in external politics in 2009 was 
called forth by external as well as internal factors. 
The former was a dialogue between the EU and 
Belarus commenced as an effort to normalize the 
mutual relationship and the aspiration of Europeans 
to involve Belarus into various integration proc-
esses. This, in particular, concerns neighbouring 
Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine.
As for the internal factors, that made A. Lukash-
enka’s regime become more active in external affairs, 
first and foremost the global financial-economic 
crisis should be taken into account since it is an 
ever-increasing threat for the archaic post-soviet 
economics of Belarus. In fact, so far Belarus failed 
to experience all consequences of the given crisis. 
Belarusian authorities see a panacea against them 
in unrestrained borrowing from the IMF and other 
sources rather than in proclaimed economic liber-
alization. In the opinion of the famous Belarusian 
economist and the former head of the National 
Bank of Belarus Stanislav Bogdankevich, so far 
Belarus basically managed to veil the crisis by 
means of loans spent on consumption. According 
to him, the amount of foreign debt alone is ap-
proaching an enormous value of 20 billion USD. 
The debt increased by one third in 2009. Internal 
debts to the banks amounted to 23 billion USD by 
the early October of 2009, having increased since 
the beginning of the year by more than 5 billion 
USD, or 22.5 %.
Despite the worsening economic situation of Belarus 
and its dependence on Russia in terms of its credits 
that usually are rendered in exchange for agree-
ments increasing the presence of Russian business 
in Belarus, the EU and the West in general tries to 
use its leverages in order to maintain Belarus on 
the geopolitical swing. 
As concerns the EU, its expectations regarding 
Belarus are mostly associated with the implementa-
tion of programmes and projects in the frames of 
the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative 
promoted by the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania. 
As is known, the given initiative was accepted with 
great suspicion in Moscow since it was perceived 
as a threat to its influence in the post-soviet space, 
especially in the field of energy security. Last news 
regarding the given issue show that the Russian 
authorities have no intention of staying passive 
observers. As is known, the project of the energy 
bridge via Belarus to supply electricity from the 
Ukraine to Lithuania is still in the air. The infor-
mation concerning the agreement with Belarus on 
energy price that has been finally reached fails to 
alter the essence of the problem. De-monopolized 
energy system is simply non-existent neither in 
Lithuania, nor in Belarus. So nobody should have 
any illusions regarding the obstacle to the above 
mentioned energy bridge - the Russian Inter RAO 
UES. 
Not only in Minsk, but in Moscow as well market 
relations are perceived rather peculiarly – they 
usually have a considerable political aftertaste. 
The same applies to the importance of Belarusian 
export to the Lithuanian seaport Klaipėda. Today 
Belarus ascribes greater importance to the Latvian 
Ventspils. It has to be admitted that A. Lukashenka 
plays the given card expertly by making Lithuanian 
business exercise pressure on its authorities to be 
exceptionally pragmatic in their cooperation with 
A. Lukashenka’s regime. The question to what 
extent the given approach is in line with national 
interests of Lithuania remains open. 
After the series of meetings of the Presidents of 
Belarus and the Ukraine, secretaries of the Security 
Councils of Belarus, the Ukraine and Poland, opti-
mism related to the participation of Belarus in the 
project of the oil pipeline Odessa-Brody-Plock could 
be observed among the politicians and experts. 
The situation today, however, is that the concern 
Belneftekhim refuses to comment the perspectives 
of the Belarusian participation in the development 
of the oil pipeline Odessa-Brody, which might 
become an alternative to the supply of the Russian 
crude oil. Press service of the concern declared that 
Belneftekhim considers any information related to 
the given issue to mass media as premature.
The most active lobbyist of the participation of 
Belarus in the given project is the Ukraine. On 19 
October in Minsk the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Ukraine Piotr Poroshenko once again confirmed 
the interest of his country in the involvement of 
Belarus in the given project.
Thus successful carrying out of the military exer-
cises of such a large scale and of such importance 
for Russia have become a favourable background 
for the reloading of Belarusian-Russian relations 
that recently have been considerably damaged. 
Experience showed that the underlying formula, 
on which the relations are being built up (economic 
preferences in exchange for the regard of strategic 
interests), was not bad at all. The more so that it 
might be difficult to exchange it into something 
else in the foreseeable future.
It should be noted 
that in Warsaw, as 
in Minsk, there is a 
common negative 
attitude towards 
the project North 
Stream, which 
can considerably 
belittle the transit 
significance of 
the two countries 
in terms of the 
transportation of 
energy resources to 
Europe.
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So far, successful were only the attempts to involve 
Minsk into the Kiev Initiative, which aims to coor-
dinate and develop regional cooperation between 
the Ukraine, Belarus and Poland in such spheres as 
illegal migration, combating drug trafficking and 
issues of energy security. Heads of the Security 
Councils of the given three countries are considered 
to be able to find common grounds more easily 
than, for example, the heads of the foreign policy 
institutions of the Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. 
Nonetheless, the forthcoming meeting in Kiev of the 
heads of MFA of the Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, 
cancelled earlier, remains vitally important. As has 
been stated, they have to discuss the issues related 
to the implementation of the programmes, projects 
in the frames of the Eastern Partnership as well 
as issues of the trilateral cooperation. It should 
be noted that in Warsaw, as in Minsk, there is a 
common negative attitude towards the project 
North Stream, which can considerably belittle 
the transit significance of the two countries in 
terms of the transportation of energy resources 
to Europe. Nevertheless, for Lukashenka it is the 
level of the presidential relationship with Warsaw 
that, however, has not matured yet. 
The ongoing dialogue of Minsk with the European 
Union, that enabled the head of the MFA of Belarus 
Sergej Martinov to pay regular visits to Brussels 
and other European capitals, is far from making 
him abstain from such public statements as, for 
example, “we don’t even discuss the possibility of 
becoming member of the EU”. Even greater anxiety 
arose in Europe, not in all its parts though, when 
S. Martinov and A. Lukashenka himself started 
claiming that Belarus would itself decide concern-
ing the participation of Belarus in the initiative’s 
programmes wherein the regime would find it 
advantageous to participate. No need to discuss 
here the principles of common values that should 
form the basis of mutual cooperation. 
Thereby the statements of A. Lukashenka made 
during his meeting with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Estonia Urmas Paet in Minsk regard-
ing the Ukraine and Belarus forming a big part of 
Europe “that we would not let anybody push out” 
may be interpreted as a sign of aggression that is 
alien to Europe.
There are reasons to assume that in case of further 
extension of the suspension of sanctions of the 
European Union for Belarus and its participation 
in the EU organized Eastern Partnership Initiative 
additional difficulties might ensue. It is not clear to 
what extent the initiative might influence the whole 
eastern strategy of the EU. However, since Minsk 
overtly ignores the value component of the given 
partnership, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
Brussels to proceed further, even having in mind 
its tolerance. Not less complex will be for the 
neighbouring countries of Belarus to overcome the 
fatigue resulting from the present dialogue with 
A. Lukashenka. Nevertheless, Vilnius, Warsaw and 
Kiev continue to expect positive changes in Minsk 
as well as hope for the possibilities to coordinate 
and develop cooperation in the bilateral relations 
(within the nascent format of quadro-group of 
Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine and Belarus) and 
within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. 
The most important thing, certainly, is not to 
confuse expectations and illusions.
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